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INFORMATION REPORT

COUNTRY Indochina

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1. The real leaders of the Viet Minh--the most important of whom were trained in Moscow--during and after the Japanese occupation had some hopes of American help, American recognition, or at least a benevolent neutrality on the part of the United States.
2. Immediately after the Japanese surrender Viet Minh propaganda stressed not only the affection of the Vietnamese for the "good" French, but also the following points regarding the United States:
 - a. The Americans and Vietnamese have fought side by side against the Japanese and their Vichy collaborators;
 - b. The Americans fought the war for the liberation of the world--consequently they will help the Vietnamese;
 - c. Viet Nam is a young republic struggling for existence, as was the United States immediately after her own revolution; Viet Nam must therefore look to America for guidance.
3. From the time of the Japanese surrender until the spring of 1946 there was little general knowledge in Indochina of the conflicting interests of Russia and the United States. The Trotskyists were the only exception; they were well aware of the conflict of interests between the great powers, and outlined the issue clearly in a manifesto issued just before the Japanese surrender. However, 25X1A Trotskyist publications soon became the principal victim of Viet Nam Government censorship. The subject of Russian-American conflicting interests was not mentioned in Viet Nam Government propaganda, and the Viet Nam Government censors were hardly troubled with it, once the Trotskyists were out of the way. By the autumn of 1945, the attitude to be adopted toward the British and the Chinese was of more immediate concern than that to be adopted toward the United States: the censors struck out any unfavorable references in publications toward either the British or the Chinese.
4. Tran Huy Lieu was in 1945 Director of Propaganda. Without ever having been in Russia, he was at heart pro-Communist and pro-Russian, but did not expect much help for Viet Nam from any external source. Lieu clearly understood and faithfully followed the propaganda line laid down by the High Command.
5. In 1945 there was no difference between the Viet Nam propaganda in European languages and that in Annamese in its attitude toward the United States. In the

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Annamese-language propaganda it was necessary to stress the likelihood of American aid, in order to encourage and solidify the people. Nevertheless, the lesser adherents of the Viet Minh after a time became discouraged at the lack of American aid, and in the spring of 1946 there began to be noticeable a certain tendency to express a stronger pro-Russian sympathy without a corresponding increase in pro-American expression. This was true not only of official publications, but even more of unofficial ones. An official publication of the Viet Nam Government, the Almanac (lich Cuu Quoc), published in August 1946, contained, together with some somewhat perfunctory favorable references to the United States, a very marked amount of pro-Russian material.

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6. At the present time, the foreign-language propaganda of the Viet Nam Government continues to give the impression that the leaders are maintaining an attitude of great patience toward the United States, despite the fact that they generally feel that the United States has armed the French in their fight against the Viet Minh. (An article in the Bangkok Viet Nam News of 1 April 1948 quoted from the Viet Nam newspaper Forward a statement that "all arms and equipment captured from the French were almost without exception of American manufacture.... This fact did not serve to foster friendship between Viet Nam and the United States.") In the Annamese-language propaganda of the Government, there is less evidence of an attitude of patience, and occasionally there is an insult offered.

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7. At the beginning of 1948, the Viet Minh issued the following secret instructions to its Can Bo's: "Since Indochina is still in the American sphere of influence, we must be careful not to offend America. The Americans are backing Bao Dai, and consequently we must preserve a discreet attitude toward this question. The time is not yet ripe for us to risk insulting the Americans." This policy has become known as "politique double" and has as its objective the gaining of time.

8. Outside the orbit of Governmental and semi-official published propaganda, which of necessity maintains a discreet camouflage, there has long been an important current of anti-American feeling in the Viet Minh. This is partly the spontaneous result of popular disappointment at the lack of American aid to the Vietnamese and at the evidences of American assistance to the French. Strictly Communist publications in Indochina, such as Su That, organ of the Association for Marxist Studies, permitted but not officially acknowledged by the Government, continue to censure the United States to a certain degree. However, the circulation of this paper is so large as to require a certain discretion; it is in the editions of Communist publications of an extremely restricted circulation that the most violently anti-American expressions are to be found.

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